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Introduction 
 
Genetics is a hugely successful science in its own right, and statistical 
approaches to genetics are credited with the revival of Darwinism in the modern 
evolutionary synthesis (Depew and Weber, 1995). But the nature of the basic 
entity in genetics, the gene, and the role it plays in development are becoming less 
clear. This is a consequence of the understanding that molecular biology has 
given us of the complexity of gene structure and action. Alongside this 
contribution from molecular biology, new conceptual work has been ongoing and 
some of this is collected in this volume. 
Cycles of Contingency (CC) describes, extends and criticizes a body of ideas 
referred to as developmental systems theory (DST). DST aims to provide a 
holistic and epigenetic view of development. In epigenesis, the developing 
organism begins in an undifferentiated state and gradually changes to a more 
complex state through multiple interactions (after Waddington, 1940). This view 
was originally contrasted with classical preformationism (sensu Aristotle), which 
held that development proceeded simply by the enlargement of pre-differentiated 
structures. The contemporary picture of development incorporates elements of 
both views, but epigenesis dominates. For example, the imaginal disc gives rise to 
an insect limb or wing largely by growth and unfolding of a pre-patterned 
epithelial layer, but, during early development the disc is created by means of 
multiple, complex interactions. 
In DST, epigenesis is broadened and contrasted with the view that genes 
control development. This view is thought to pervade the modern sciences of 
development and evolution, which often employ metaphors, in reference to genes, 
that are thought to assign them undue causal influence. This idea is explored in 
CC and in this review, in the context of “genetic information.” 
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The book also explores the impact that gene-centrism has on our understanding 
of evolutionary dynamics. In population genetics, for example, evolution is 
construed only in terms of genetic change and, since environmental contingencies 
cannot be obviously affected by genes, evolution is seen to arise largely from 
external and autonomous selection pressures. DST redefines evolution as change 
in lineages of developmental systems. These systems are beyond “the organism” 
and comprise “cycles of contingency” operating between various “developmental 
resources” (including genes and “environmental” influences). Cycles are 
contingent because the impact one resource has, is, in part, a function of the other 
resources within the system. Developmental systems, in this sense, are not just 
read-outs of a genomically encoded developmental program. So, DST contains a 
strong notion of epigenesis, which moves beyond its traditional conception and 
has broad implications for many areas in biology. 
 
The implications of DST 
 
What are the consequences of this rearrangement of traditional notions? One 
answer is offered by Peter Godfrey-Smith (chapter 20), who suggests that a new 
framework of explanation may prove useful for developing a coherent account of 
biology across its diverse scientific disciplines. He characterises DST, in this 
sense, as a “philosophy of nature” compatible with, but not a replacement for, 
current notions. But, DST might reveal new kinds of developmental and 
evolutionary dynamics because factors formerly regarded as mere “contingencies” 
move onto the main stage. 
One example of this is niche construction. This is presented, in this volume, in 
a classic paper by Richard Lewontin, for which he gives a new introduction 
(chapters 5 and 6), and it is also the subject of chapter 10 by Kevin Laland, John 
Odling-Smee and Marcus Feldman. Niche construction is the process by which 
organisms determine and construct their environments. This means that evolution 
involves reciprocal exchanges between organism and environment, which 
Lewontin contrasts with the conventional “lock and key” notion of adaptation 
whereby the environment poses a problem for the organism (the lock), which the 
adapted organism overcomes (the key). In chapter 10, the beaver’s dam is given 
as an example. The dam is “inherited” by the beaver’s offspring and it can affect 
the evolution of other species because it creates and sustains riverside wetlands. 
Laland et al. argue that organism-environment exchanges cannot be understood 
fully in terms of the extended phenotype (Dawkins, 1982) because they include 
the intergenerational effects of ecological modifications (viz. “ecological 
inheritance”). 
Another example is the evolutionary phenomenon introduced by William 
Wimsatt (chapter 17) as “generative entrenchment” (GE). GE is an inevitable or 
“generic” property of evolving developmental systems whereby certain elements 
Evolutionary Psychology – ISSN 1474-7049 – Volume 1. 2003. 109
Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution 
of these systems contribute disproportionately to the developmental process. As a 
result, these elements become entrenched or “frozen” over evolutionary time. For 
example, the mechanisms underlying cell division are unlikely to change in 
evolution because a modification, genetic or otherwise, in any part of this 
interdependent system will likely have severely deleterious effects. Broadly, GE 
and its consequences are to seen as statistical generalities that emerge during 
development and/or evolution and are self-reinforcing. Although this chapter is 
largely conceptual, the roles of GE in gene networks and the evolution of culture, 
for example, are explored. 
The phenomena of niche construction and GE force us to acknowledge a 
broader range of interactions than traditionally accommodated. But, DST aims to 
be more inclusive and one aspect of this is the reluctance in DST to “privilege” 
genes over other “developmental resources”. 
Concerns about the role that genes play in evolutionary processes sound 
familiar and raise hackles for some in biology. This is because politicized and 
rather hackneyed criticisms of evolutionary approaches arise frequently, which 
take the metaphorical vocabulary used at face value. For example, talk of “genes 
for” a particular trait has been seen as indicative of genetic determinism, although 
this term is used to refer simply to variant stretches of DNA that correlate with the 
trait in question. Likewise, the reductionism of genetics is held to reflect a 
simplistic view of reality, rather it being, more minimally and realistically, the 
“most successful research stratagem ever devised” (Medawar and Medawar, 
1983). 
CC largely avoids these excesses because, while its core thesis is critical of 
classical gene selectionism, its approach is refreshingly constructive. For 
example, Lenny Moss (chapter 8), examining the gene concept as it is used in 
molecular biology, makes the distinction between what genes do and what they 
are for by dividing the concept of the gene into two new versions that reflect each 
of these senses. Looking specifically at what genes, or more precisely stretches of 
DNA, do, it becomes clear they cannot do much without interacting with other 
molecules, and it is not even easy to describe all the processes that go into the 
production of a specific polypeptide sequence. The emphasis is therefore shifted 
away from genes that direct the processes of development to a complex molecular 
developmental system that incorporates them. 
Of course, genes are necessary for these processes, but do they control them? It 
seems that we must wait for more research into such exotic molecular processes 
as RNA editing. In RNA editing, specific nucleotides within the sequences of 
messenger RNA transcripts are modified during or after splicing. This process 
disrupts the one to one relation that otherwise obtains between DNA and 
polypeptide sequences. 
Moving away from details for a moment, there is a sense in which DST’s 
tendency to de-emphasise genes in development is a welcome change. After the 
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hype of the human genome project, the general reader should be encouraged to be 
skeptical of lofty talk about the significance of the number of genes and to resist 
the impression that geneticists are now so well equipped that they can peer into 
any problem in biology using newly available sequence data alone. For those 
actively researching gene functions, however, traditional techniques and 
approaches are not likely to lose their popularity because of the criticisms in this 
book. Furthermore, these approaches are, in fact, uncovering further subtleties 
relating to, for example, epigenetic inheritance. (With epigenetic mechanisms, the 
patterns of gene activity that contribute to a differentiated state are established and 
maintained through, for example, modifications of chromatin or methylation of 
DNA. Some epigenetic changes, such as those involved in genomic imprinting, 
can be inherited. For a review of these phenomena see Li, 2002). 
 
Holism in DST 
 
There are also some costs associated with DST’s holistic approach. The 
simplest is that, if we were to adopt it as the gold standard, we would be ignoring 
some of the great achievements of reductive biology. Take, for example, the 
discovery of Hox/HOM gene complexes (acknowledged in chapter 20). The 
arrangement of these genes along the chromosome mirrors the position of the 
structures they “switch on and off” along various body axes and they are 
conserved across a remarkably broad range of phyla. (Hox-like genes are even 
found in Cnidaria; Ferrier and Holland, 2001). But, might a holistic approach 
give rise to positive misunderstanding? Criticism and defense of DST’s holism is 
offered in the last section of CC. But in what follows, I should declare that my 
sympathies lie very much with the critical contributors. 
One risk related to holistic frameworks is that, by trying to explain so much, 
they may end up explaining nothing. This problem is, I believe, demonstrated by 
the book’s treatment of conceptions of information as applied to biological 
systems. Specifically, it is doubtful that a notion of information compatible with 
DST’s holism can be derived, but by discarding current conceptions, some 
contributors may create confusion about the roles played by genes and other 
resources in development and evolution. 
 
Holism and information 
 
It is useful to define information. Information describes the situation in which 
an element of a system, by inputting energy or matter into the remainder, 
consistently gives rise to a signal, when other elements (or channels) are fixed. 
This consistency in relations between input and signal allows a looser definition 
that does not depend on the fixity or otherwise of channels. Information, in this 
sense, is anything that reduces uncertainty in developmental outcomes. In normal 
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use, however, information includes the notion of intent because of its association 
with language. 
Any geneticist will recognize talk of genetic blueprints as misguided, but may 
nonetheless employ information concepts freely: RNA editing aside, genes are 
said to encode polypeptides, and genes are expressed during the course of 
development. What many contributors to this volume aver is that this kind of talk 
is dangerous because the colloquial concept of information also implies a subtle 
form of gene-centred preformationism. The mainstream geneticist might counter 
that these notions still allow developmental outcomes to be contingent on various 
environmental or extra-genetic factors (which we can call channels). But this is 
seen as an insufficient defense: these contingencies create more than variations 
upon “the intended” theme and they should instead be seen as integral aspects of 
the comprehensively epigenetic (sensu Waddington) development envisaged in 
DST. 
Taking this one step further, some contributors (and the editors) argue that 
information concepts should not be used, while an enlightening chapter (9) relies 
on information concepts to describe, in detail, the many different systems of 
extra-genetic inheritance. By defining, for each mode of inheritance, the nature of 
the information involved and the manner of its storage (for example), Eva 
Jablonka clarifies the roles that these modes or channels might play in evolution. 
Interactions between different inheritance channels can occur in this scheme by 
allowing that they are not autonomous but linked. To this end, I would add that 
traditional approaches might benefit from a further extended notion of epistasis, 
one that operates between inheritance channels. (In Mendelian genetics, epistasis 
refers to the situation in which the genotype of a given locus interferes with the 
expression of the genotype from another, but the definition is extended in 
quantitative genetics, because any kind of interaction between loci is included). 
This could be useful in evolutionary studies, because it allows gene-environment 
correlations or interactions to be considered separately from interactions between 
genes and other heritable (environmental) factors (the latter interactions being 
classed epistatic). 
Since evolution acts on heritable variation, must genes now take a back seat to 
other forms of inheritance? A mildly critical chapter (23) questions this by 
showing why modern day evolutionary biology is so focussed on genetic 
information as opposed to other kinds. Kim Sterelny invents “Hoyle’s criteria” 
which describe the kinds of properties replicators would need to possess if, when 
used to seed an empty planet, they were to create a rich flora and fauna like that 
on earth. It turns out that genes fulfill most of the requisite conditions while other 
inheritance channels are less well suited and less evolvable. As cautioned 
elsewhere, however, interaction between different channels of inheritance and 
between the organism and its environment (niche construction), have 
consequences for evolutionary dynamics. 
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Since these accounts selectively employ information concepts (for heritable 
factors), it might be argued that they incorporate preformationist assumptions a 
priori. With respect to the role of genetic information, it is no doubt true that 
nature never holds all other inheritance channels constant, but this becomes a 
problem only when this inconstancy covaries with the (genetic) input under 
consideration (see below). So, we can still benefit from information concepts 
when they are construed as means by which uncertainty, in development, is 
reduced. I would challenge contributors to develop a holistic/non-informational 
account that can incorporate this meaning. 
There is, then, it seems to me, no knockdown argument against the use of 
information concepts in this volume, but Evelyn Fox-Keller, in a detailed 
historical analysis (chapter 21), shows that, while arguments about the necessity 
or sufficiency of particular developmental resources cannot be used to exclude 
information talk, they can ruin notions of an exclusively genetic developmental 
program. I would add to this that information of a non-genetic nature is not just 
relevant with regard to the variety of phenotypes possible (as implied by work in 
quantitative genetics). Environments provide information relevant in the 
construction of phenotype and they should be seen, therefore, as more than life-
support for its invariant aspects. 
 
Measuring information 
 
Should we put an end to the traditional approaches employed in genetics to 
measure “information”? Or should we preserve them as useful parts of an 
expanding toolkit? Contrary to Patrick Bateson’s conclusions (chapter 13), I do 
not think it is yet time to celebrate “the demise of heritability.” 
A heritability estimate is a measure of the degree of genetic determination of a 
phenotype within a particular population in a given and fixed environment. There 
should be no need to be embarrassed by the “d” word: determinism. Correlations 
do imply causes, but that genes may determine an outcome, when other factors 
are held constant, does not mean that they are the sole causes in development. 
Bateson describes examples of condition-dependent development such as 
genetically identical grasshoppers that can adopt alternate colours when young to 
suit their environment. He also examines the impact of birth weights on 
subsequent health, independent of (often) persistent socio-economic effects. 
By these means, Bateson does show that heritability cannot capture the 
subtleties of development in full detail, but his case against heritability as a 
reliable measure (p155-6) flows from the observed correlation between offspring 
phenotypes, on the one hand, and parent-offspring phenotype-genotype 
differences, on the other. This seems to raise a problem with heritability measures 
that is perhaps worst in humans: that is, covariance between genetic values and 
environmental deviations cannot be elided with genetic variance because the 
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former is affected by parental genotypes in addition to that of the focal individual 
(p131-2, Falconer and Mackay, 1996). The evolutionary consequences of other 
genotypes in the environment are addressed in a recent paper (Wolf, 2003). 
It is interesting, however, that this problem with heritability estimates is 
revealed by a correlative analysis. This implies that this type of measure, of which 
heritability is an example, can reveal useful information (!) about development. 
This is an important point, because to the extent that heritability estimates can be 
of practical use to the farmer (as acknowledged by Bateson), they can also 
provide information about the degree of genetic determination of developmental 
systems in particular populations and environmental settings. When it is possible 
to produce animals with replicate genotypes and raise them in different 
environments, further information can be obtained about the extent of gene-
environment interaction by means of an analysis of variance (p132-3, Falconer 
and Mackay, 1996) and this can perhaps be achieved in humans by including 
specific environmental measures in twin studies. (For an interesting further 
analysis of the nature and implications of heritability estimates, see Chapter 19 of 
The Blank Slate by Steven Pinker). Heritability, then, is a blunt instrument for 
looking into development, but it is instrumental nonetheless. 
 
An outline 
 
In summary, CC sometimes over-eggs the pudding, but it contains a great deal 
to attract and absorb those interested in the philosophy of biology. It should also 
engage those wishing to understand the impact of developmentalist thinking on 
the sciences of molecular genetics, behaviour (not addressed in the present 
review) and evolution. More broadly, this book should appeal to anyone, from 
professors to undergraduate students, who is interested in the core ideas of 
biology. And the practical scientist will find many important ideas, relevant to 
work at the coalface, brought together in this well edited book. 
Sometimes the reader will need to get to grips with a difficult style of writing; 
however, the meaning is generally evident from the context and can be worked 
through by the careful reader. The book is well structured and self-critical. While 
I have ventured to build upon these criticisms in some places and to add further 
criticism in others, I do commend the editors’ and contributors’ interesting and 
constructive contributions to modern biology. 
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